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Abstract
You’re sitting in a bar with eight friends, everyone staring at one hot guy. The only caveat is that you can’t get
his attention, and neither can anyone else. If you do something to get noticed all your friends will regard you
as a traitor and, while the guy might be cute, he’s not worth that much. So you and your friends have two
options: 1. Sit around and stare at him, on the odd chance that he might come over on his own. 2. Everyone
chips in to buy him a drink from the group; then he will definitely notice your group, and he can decide on his
own whom he wants to leave the bar with, if anyone.
What the friends would do in such a situation depends not only on each individual girl’s confidence in
winning the guy, but also on each girl’s willingness to risk the cost of the drink, knowing that there is a pretty
good chance that she herself will not get the guy.
When other forms of communities make decisions about the functioning of their systems of government,
welfare, wealth-management, and trade, they often follow similar lines of thinking. Many internal communal
policies are founded upon the amount of risk that the individuals in the community are willing to take, and
the discussion between John Rawls and John C. Harsanyi on a democratic politic’s moral responsibility is
based on the moral riskiness which each attributes to society’s members.
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A Drink from the Group 
You’re sitting in a bar with eight friends, everyone staring at one hot guy.  The 
only caveat is that you can’t get his attention, and neither can anyone else.  If you do 
something to get noticed all your friends will regard you as a traitor and, while the guy 
might be cute, he’s not worth that much.  So you and your friends have two options: 
1. Sit around and stare at him, on the odd chance that he might come over on his own. 
2. Everyone chips in to buy him a drink from the group; then he will definitely notice 
your group, and he can decide on his own whom he wants to leave the bar with, if 
anyone. 
 
Risk and Justice 
 What the friends would do in such a situation depends not only on each individual 
girl’s confidence in winning the guy, but also on each girl’s willingness to risk the cost of 
the drink, knowing that there is a pretty good chance that she herself will not get the guy.  
When other forms of communities make decisions about the functioning of their systems 
of government, welfare, wealth-management, and trade, they often follow similar lines of 
thinking.  Many internal communal policies are founded upon the amount of risk that the 
individuals in the community are willing to take, and the discussion between John Rawls 
and John C. Harsanyi on a democratic politic’s moral responsibility is based on the moral 
riskiness which each attributes to society’s members. 
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It is important to recognize that the scope of this discussion applies to a small 
community, preferably one in which people know each other and have some relationship 
with one another, such as the nine girls in the bar.  While each person is concerned with 
her own happiness, there is a sense of individual responsibility to assure that the 
community functions well.  The details of why this is necessary will become clear in the 
discussion of Rawls’ and Harsanyi’s “veil of ignorance”/ “equiprobability model.” 
 One other general comment before beginning the core of the paper – utility, 
wealth, and happiness are all different things.  One’s happiness is not solely dependant 
upon how much money he has, and his utility for certain things may change despite their 
dollar value remaining the same.  For simplicity, these three terms are conflated into one 
idea in this paper, all three referring to “How much a person wants something.”  However 
it is critical that not as economists or philosophers or political scientists, but as human 
beings qua human beings, we recognize the importance of happiness as an immeasurable 
good.  That being said, this paper measures all benefit, or utility, as a dollar value 
stemming from a situation’s worth in monetary terms. 
 
Determining Morality: John Rawls 
 When a society determines its just policies, each individual must, according to 
John Rawls, consider himself as though behind a “veil of ignorance,” where he does not 
know who he is, what position he has in society, or what his likes and dislikes are.  In this 
“original position,” without knowing anything about himself, the person will then have to 
make a decision for what society should look like.  Since he will not be biased to his own 
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benefit, (since he does not know what his benefit will be,) the individual enters into a 
contractarian-like system which will be the most just for all of society. 
 When in this original position, Rawls’ man will choose a “democratic idea of 
justice”1 that combines two principles: 
1. “Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to meet two conditions: they must be 
a. To the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society (the maximin equity criterion) and 
b. Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.”2
While all of these principles are associated with an unwillingness on behalf of the 
veiled individual to take risk, the most clear illustration of risk-adversity is 2a – the 
maximin criterion.3 For Rawls, a person under the veil of ignorance will choose an idea 
of justice that, in the circumstance that he ends up at the bottom of the socio-economic 
ladder, (which he does not know until the veil is removed,) he will be as well-off as he 
can be.  So a person choosing between an environment in which ninety-nine percent of 
people have $100 each and one percent have $1 each, and a society in which everyone 
has $20 each, the person under the veil of ignorance will choose the latter, because of the 
 
1 John Rawls, “Concepts of Distributional Equity: Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion,”  The 
American Economic Review May 1974: Vol. 64 No. 2 pp. 142. 
2 John Rawls, “Concepts of Distributional Equity: Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion,”  The 
American Economic Review May 1974: Vol. 64 No. 2 pp. 142. 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 72. 
3 Rawls does draw a difference between the maximin principle and the difference principle, based on the 
levels of risk associated with each.  He writes, “The maximin criterion is generally understood as a rule for 
choice under great uncertainty, whereas the difference principle is a principle of justice.” (A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 72.) 
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fear that he may belong to that one percent who in the first circumstance have $1 and in 
the later one have $20.  (See appendix A.)  According to Rawls, this is what people will 
choose. 
 This choice is not obvious though.  Some people under the veil of ignorance may 
wish to ignore the maximin principle, and instead they may be willing to sacrifice 
whoever receives the lowest utility, (even if it does turn out to be them themselves,) so 
that the rest of society can have $100 each.  This line of thinking is similar to the reaction 
Harsanyi writes that people will have under the veil of ignorance. 
 
Determining Morality: John C. Harsanyi 
 John C. Harsanyi writes that in order to determine moral preference, “every 
individual will have to be guided by certain impartial and impersonal criteria when he is 
trying to make a moral value judgment.  Indeed, by definition, any evaluative judgment 
based on biased, partial, and personal criteria will not be a moral judgment at all, but 
rather will be a mere judgment of personal preference.”4 In order to understand and 
define morality, a person needs to put himself in a position where he does not have a bias 
towards one outcome over another, but rather is, in a utilitarian sense, vying for the best 
outcome for society. 
 The need for impartiality brings Harsanyi to a concept similar to Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance,5 albeit with a more mathematical definition. 
 
4 John C. Harsanyi, “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,”  The Amecian Economic Review 
Vol 68 No 2 pp. 226. 
5 Harsanyi claims that this concept appeared in his analysis of morality before it was published by Rawls. 
John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?  A Critique of John Rawls’s 
Theory,” The American Economic Review Vol 68 No 2 pp. 595. 
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Now, a value judgment on the distribution of income would show the 
required impersonality to the highest degree if the person who made this 
judgment had to choose a particular income distribution in complete 
ignorance of what his own relative position (and the position of those near 
to his heart) would be within the system chosen.  This would be the case if 
he had exactly the same chance of obtaining the first position 
(corresponding to the highest income) or the second or the third, etc., up to 
the last position (corresponding to the lowest income) available within that 
scheme.6
Each person has to choose a societal system from a perspective in which not only does he 
not know where he will be in society (as in Rawls’ theory,) but also one in which he does 
know that he has an equal chance of any of the possibilities. 
Thus Harsanyi describes how we should expect the moral individual to determine 
whether situation A or situation B has greater morality, assuming that he is one individual 
in a society of n number of people: 
He would certainly satisfy our impartiality and impersonality requirements 
if he did not know how his choice between A and B would affect him 
personally and, in particular, if he did not know what his own social 
position would be in situations A and B.  More specifically, let us assume 
he would think that in either situation he would have the same probability 
1/n to occupy any one of the n possible social positions and, indeed, to be 
 
6 John C. Harsanyi, “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking,” The Journal 
of Political Economy Vol 61 No 5 pp. 434. 
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put in the place of any one of the n individuals in the society...  I will call 
this assumption the equiprobability model of moral value judgments.7
While there is a slight difference between Rawls’ “original position” and 
Harsanyi’s eqiprobability model, it is mostly in their semantics; the notion of making a 
decision for society without the individual knowing who he is, is alike in both 
philosophies.  “But the usefulness of this concept crucially depends on its being 
combined with a satisfactory decision rule.”8 The real difference between their outcomes 
is how, while under the veil of ignorance, the individual chooses principles for the basis 
of moral institutions – What decision rule does a person use when he is removed from 
bias? 
 Harsanyi, using principles of Bayesian decision theory, disagrees with the use of 
Rawls’ maximin principle in this situation, claiming that “It is extremely irrational to 
make your behavior wholly dependent on some highly unlikely unfavorable 
contingencies regardless of how little probability you are willing to assign to them.”9
Harsanyi does not want the individual to maximize the benefit to the person who is least 
well-off, because if there is a very small chance that the individual will become that 
person, he will be willing to take that chance and to risk being worse-off in favor of 
having a possibility of doing better if he is in a different position.  In the example given 
above, a person would be willing, according to Harsanyi, to risk having $1 if he has a 
 
7 John C. Harsanyi, “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,”  The Amecian Economic Review 
Vol 68 No 2 pp. 227. 
8 John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?  A Critique of John Rawls’s 
Theory,” The American Economic Review Vol 68 No 2 pp. 595. 
9 John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?  A Critique of John Rawls’s 
Theory,” The American Economic Review Vol 68 No 2 pp. 595. 
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good chance of receiving $100, and is willing to take that risk rather than settle for the 
assured $20. 
 To illustrate this point, Harsanyi gives an example of someone who resides in 
New York and is offered a great job in Chicago.  The person will take the job, even 
though going from New York to Chicago means risking the small chance of a plane 
crash, because the probability of such an accident is small, and the reward if there is no 
accident is great.10 Harsanyi is recommending that when people make decisions they do 
not base them on the worst thing that could happen to them.  Rather, people make life 
choices based on reasonably weighing the probabilities and benefits of possible outcomes 
to their decisions. 
This utilizes Bayesian decision theory, in which the utility one expects to receive 
from a circumstance is the addition of the utility from various situations, each one 
multiplied by the probability of that situation occurring given the circumstance.  (See 
appendix B.)  For example, if when you wear a blue shirt, there is a twenty percent 
chance that you will get $100 and an eighty percent chance you will get $500, and if you 
wear a red shirt there is a ten percent chance of receiving $10,000, and a ninety percent 
chance of receiving nothing, then you will calculate your decision based on the 
following: 
Expected utility from blue shirt = [20% * $100] + [80% * $500] = $420 
Expected utility from red shirt = [10% * $10,000] + [90% * $0] = $1,000 
One thousand is greater than 420, so you will choose to wear the red shirt. 
 
10John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?  A Critique of John Rawls’s 
Theory,” The American Economic Review Vol 68 No 2 pp. 595. 
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In Harsanyi’s words, “The main conclusion of Bayesian theory is that a rational 
decision maker under risk and under uncertainty will act in such a way as to maximize his 
expected utility.”11 
If this is the way people make choices in their own lives, then the individual 
making decisions for society in the equiprobability model will make his decisions the 
same manner.  Thus the unbiased decision of the individual will take into account the 
probabilities and expected utilities from possible outcomes of various social possibilities.  
Each person will maximize his expected utility based on his having 1/n probability of 
having any of n social positions.  The resulting decision will be a moral value judgment 
which maximizes social welfare12 in a utilitarian manner. 
 
Risk 
 One of the crucial differences between Rawls’ contractarian approach and 
Harsanyi’s utilitarian view is their perspective on risk.  Harsanyi assumes that people in 
the equiprobability condition are rational and therefore risk-neutral to a certain extent, 
while Rawls considers people behind the veil of ignorance to choose a risk-averse 
strategy. 
In other words, for Rawls, people who do not know what their fate will be will 
choose a strategy where in the worst-comes-to-worst situation, they will be the best they 
can be, thereby avoiding any potential for being in a horrific situation; these people are 
avoiding that risk.  Although Rawls claims that part of the veil of ignorance includes that 
 
11John C. Harsanyi, “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,”  The Amecian Economic Review 
Vol 68 No 2 pp. 224. 
12 John C. Harsanyi, “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,”  The Amecian Economic Review 
Vol 68 No 2 pp. 228. 
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“The parties do not know… special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk 
or liability to optimist or pessimism,”13 it is clear from the choices that people make 
under the maximin principle that Rawls assumes that they are all considerably risk-
averse.  However Rawls himself puts this notion in a different way, trying to escape the 
extreme riskiness which he seems to assign to the people in the original condition: 
The essential thing [in justice as fairness] is not to allow the principles 
chosen to depend on special attitudes toward risk.  For this reason the veil 
of ignorance also rules out the knowledge of these inclinations: the parties 
do not know whether or not they have an unusual aversion to taking 
chances.  As far as possible the choice of a conception of justice should 
depend on a rational assessment of accepting risks unaffected by peculiar 
individual preferences for taking chances one way or the other… What 
must be shown is that given the unique features of this situation, agreeing 
to these principles rather than the principle of utility is rational for anyone 
whose aversion to uncertainty in regard to being able to secure their 
fundamental interests is within the normal range.14 
However, it is still clear that Rawls’ justice-finders are risk averse, when we 
consider the following definition of risk:  A person who is risk-neutral considers his 
expected utility from various possibilities and probabilities, as described before.  A 
 
13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 118. 
14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 149. 
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person who is risk-averse considers not only his expected utility, but also weighs heavily 
the probability of a negative result.15 
In his 1974 article, Rawls addresses this form of risk-aversion and admits that 
“From the standpoint of the original position, the parties will surely be very considerably 
risk-averse; if we ask how risk-averse, we might say not less than that of most any 
normal person.”16 Rawls supports his view of the maximin criteria because he believes 
that this amount of risk-aversion is “normal.”17 Rawls even considers that the “normal” 
risk-aversion is so high that even utilitarians would need to take it into account, and 
would, if placed in the original condition, come up with a result similar to his maximin 
principle.  As he writes in A Theory of Justice, comparing the utilitarian view with his 
own difference principle: 
Risk and uncertainty from a suitably general perspective leads both views 
to weight more heavily the advantages of those whose situation is less 
fortunate.  In fact, reasonable risk aversion may be so great, once the 
enormous hazards of the decision in the original position are fully 
appreciated, that the utilitarian weighting may be, for practical purposes, 
so close to the difference principle as to make the simplicity of the latter 
decisive in its favor.18 
15 Thus, in the example given earlier on page 7 an individual who is risk-neutral will wear the red shirt, 
whereas a risk-averse person may not want to risk receiving nothing and will opt for the blue shirt despite 
the lower expected utility. 
16 John Rawls, “Concepts of Distributional Equity: Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion,”  The 
American Economic Review May 1974: Vol. 64 No. 2 pp. 143. 
17 Rawls himself writes, “I have noted several reasons that support the maximin criterion: very considerable 
normal risk-aversion…”  (John Rawls, “Concepts of Distributional Equity: Some Reasons for the Maximin 
Criterion,”  The American Economic Review May 1974: Vol. 64 No. 2 pp. 142.) 
18 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 144. 
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Harsanyi rejects Rawls’ view of “the high level of risk aversion that it seems any 
normal person would have in the original position,”19 and instead assumes people to be 
rational, with almost no risk-aversion.  He writes, “It is natural to expect that, in making 
important policy decisions, responsible decision makers will take a result-oriented 
attitude toward risk taking… A rational decision maker under risk and under uncertainty 
will act in such a way as to maximize his expected utility.”20 Harsanyi thinks of the 
policy makers – the same characters who are featured in the eqiprobability model – to be 
rational and therefore risk-averse in the following way: 
In the case of risk and of uncertainty, an individual’s choices can be 
modeled as choices among different lotteries whose “prizes” are 
situations… A rational individual will be indifferent between two risky 
lotteries if these yield him the same prizes with the same probabilities… 
The decision maker will take a purely result-oriented attitude toward 
lotteries, and will derive all his utility and disutility from the prizes he may 
or may not win through these lotteries, rather than from the act of 
gambling itself.21 
Here Harsanyi is not allowing for any risk-aversion to enter into the mindset of the policy 
maker in the uncertain state of the eqiprobability model. 
 However Harsanyi’s view is not of complete risk-neutrality, but rather of a 
limited risk-aversion that is taken into account under von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions, which account not for preferences of the value of the outcome itself, but for 
 
19 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 144. 
20 John C. Harsanyi, “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,”  The Amecian Economic Review 
Vol 68 No 2 pp. 225. 
21 John C. Harsanyi, “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,”  The Amecian Economic Review 
Vol 68 No 2 pp. 223-4. 
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preferences regarding lotteries of outcomes.22 In other words, a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function is not the expected dollar payoff, but rather the expected 
utility value of the game.23 This value includes diminishing marginal utility of wealth – 
that a poor person values $1 more than a rich person – and includes the value or disvalue 
of risk.  (A gambler adds additional value to risky situations, while many people consider 
risk itself to be a disutility.)  Thus the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function takes 
into account a certain amount of risk-aversion, which one would expect from a person.  
“Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions have a completely legitimate place in ethics 
because they express the subjective importance people attach to their various needs and 
interests.”24 Using this function, Harsanyi’s individual in the eqiprobability model can 
decide on policies that will not be completely risk-averse, but will take into account some 
amount of disutility from risk. 
 
Risk and Evolutionary Dynamics 
 When discussing evolutionary dynamics risk needs to be looked at from a 
different perspective.  According to the theory of evolutionary dynamics, decisions are 
not based on immediate payoffs, but rather on the multiplication of those payoffs over 
generations; thus the Bayesian model, as well as the risk-averse model, need to be 
modified in order to understand them in the context of evolutionary dynamics. 
 First the dynamic itself must be explained.  Imagine that in each generation 
person A receives wealth related to the situation he is in, as well as his choices in that 
 
22 Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory (Oxford U.P. 2004) page 102. 
23 Zvi Bodie, et al., Investments (McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2005) page 192 note. 
24 John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?  A Critique of John 
Rawls’s Theory,” The American Economic Review Vol 68 No 2 pp. 600. 
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situation.  If he is wealthy, then people in the next generation will want to be just like 
him, and therefore A will multiply by a large number.  If he is poor, people will not 
mimic him, and he will be multiplied by a small number. 
Thus if a person is in a situation where wearing a green shirt will get him a lot of 
money, then in the next generation there will be 10 people who wear green shirts.  If they 
continue to make money due to their shirt color then in the next generation there will be 
100 green-shirt wearers.  On the other hand, if a person in that situation wears a brown 
shirt, and is therefore poor, then in the next generation only two people will be wearing 
brown shirts, four in the following generation, and so on. 
 The important aspect for the decision under uncertainty is the risk of being in 
different situations.  First we will consider a situation where there will be a consistent 
environment, but where there is uncertainty regarding which environment it will be.  (See 
appendix C.)  There are two possibilities – from here on the world will be in situation X 
or situation Y, with an equal chance of each.  The individual has a decision to take action 
B or C.  If he chooses B and there is situation X, then he will be multiplied by two in 
each following generation. (For simplicity, I assume that there are four total generations, 
including the original individual.  However this will work the same way with any number 
of generations.)  If he chooses B and there is situation Y then he will be multiplied by 6 
in each generation.  If he chooses C then he will be multiplied by four, regardless of the 
situation. 
 If this was a discussion of standard decision theory then the outcome would be as 
follows: 
BS (1/2)2 + (1/2)6 = 4 
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CS (1)4 = 4 
So for the risk-averse individual, the choice would be C, and for the risk-neutral Bayesian 
decider, B and C would be equally good choices. 
 However in evolutionary dynamics, the decisions would be quite different. 
BS (1/2)[1*2*2*2] + (1/2)[1*6*6*6] = (1/2)*8 + (1/2)*216 = 112 
CS (1)[1*4*4*4] = 64 
Here the risk-neutral individual will certainly decide on B, with an expected utility of 
112, as opposed to 64.  The risk-averse individual will have to make a decision as to 
whether it is worthwhile for him to take the chance that he may, after four generations, 
have a total of 8 in the worst-case scenario that situation X arises.  According to Rawls’ 
way of looking at man’s decisions, the “normal” risk-adversity would utilize the maximin 
rule, minimizing potential losses, and choosing C. 
 There is another type of evolutionary dynamic regarding this issue.  (See 
appendix D.)  The above example assumes that there will be a consistent environment; 
there the choice a person makes depends on his risk-adversity.  However it is possible 
that the environment itself is inconsistent, and instead of remaining either X or Y for all 
four generations, the environment may change, and each year has a fifty percent chance 
of being either situation, regardless of what it was the year before.  C will yield the same 
(1)[1*4*4*4] = 64 as before, because it is not contingent on either situation X or Y.  B’s 
yield is dependant upon the environment: 
If the environment is X, X, X, then B S 1*2*2*2 = 8
If the environment is X, X, Y, then B S 1*2*2*6 = 24
If the environment is X, Y, X, then B S 1*2*6*2 = 24
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If the environment is X, Y, Y, then B S 1*2*6*6 = 72
If the environment is Y, X, X, then B S 1*6*2*2 = 24
If the environment is Y, X, Y, then B S 1*6*2*6 = 72
If the environment is Y, Y, X, then B S 1*6*6*2 = 72
If the environment is Y, Y, Y, then B S 1*6*6*6 = 216
There is an equal chance that any of these situation will occur, so the expected utility for 
B is (1/8)*8 + (1/8)*24 + (1/8)*24 + (1/8)*72 + (1/8)*24 + (1/8)*72 + (1/8)*72 + 
(1/8)*216 = (1/8)*512 = 64 
This concludes with the same results as the simple decision theory; for the risk-averse 
individual, the choice would be C, and for the risk-neutral Bayesian decider, B and C 
would be equally good choices. 
Therefore, when discussing situations of uncertain circumstances where each 
generation’s environment is unknown, even in relation to the previous one, evolutionary 
dynamics and rational choice game theory will both result in the same model.  Since 
communities are usually unsure of what cultural, social, and economic environments they 
will face in the long-term, the rational-choice game-theory model is a good way to look at 
the risky decisions these communities make. 
 
Buying the Drink?  A Community’s Adoption of Justice Principles 
 
To gain a perspective on how a community in uncertainty makes decisions under 
the veil of ignorance/equiprobability model, reconsider the group of women in the bar, 
and assume the following parameters: (See appendix E.) 
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 There are 9 women in the group. 
 The man will only choose one woman. 
 Each women values the man’s choosing her at $100.25 
 A drink costs $9.  (If all of the women buy one drink together, it costs each 
woman $1.) 
 Being a traitor against the group costs $500 in friendship-value.26 
 If they sit and stare, there is a 10% chance that he will come over to the group. 
 If they buy him a drink, there is a 100% chance that he will come over. 
 If he comes over, there is a 10% chance of his choosing each individual, and a 
10% chance that he does not choose anyone. 
 
Under Rawls’ veil of ignorance, each woman, not knowing whether she had a 
better chance than the other at winning the man (thereby assuming her chances are 10% 
as stated above,) would consider the following possibilities: 
Strategy 1 – Sit & Stare: If she is chosen, she will have the value of $100.
If the man does not come to the group, or if he comes over and 
does not choose her, then she has $0.
Strategy 2 – Buy a Drink: If she is chosen, she will have the value of $100 - $1 (value of  
being chosen minus her share of the drink) = $99.
25 In reality the value to each women is likely to be different, however for simplicity we assume that all the 
women are identical.  This makes an interesting point about communities – they will function in a way 
similar to the one described here if they are more or less homogeneous. 
26 This indicates that there is some form of community pre-existent in the situation.  The question discussed 
at present is whether they will form a “community” with the specific aim of catching the man’s attention by 
buying him a drink. 
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If she is not chosen, she will have the value of $0 - $1 (value 
of not being chosen minus her share of the drink) = -$1. 
According to Rawls’ theory of justice, in this situation each woman will look at 
the possible payoffs to her – either [0,100] or [-1,99].  Using Rawls’ maximin strategy, 
each woman will only consider what will happen to her in the worst-case-scenario – 
when she is not chosen.  Thus she is choosing between $0 and -$1, where she will choose 
$0, which is the Sit & Stare strategy.  For Rawls the risk of $1 for an increased 
probability of winning the man is not worthwhile to the individual, so the women will not 
form a coalition to catch the man’s attention by buying a drink.27 
Harsanyi’s women, however, would consider not their worst-case-scenario, but 
rather their probabilities for each situation.  Thus, the following thoughts are going 
through each of their heads:  
Strategy 1 – Sit & Stare: There is a 10% chance that he will come over, and if he does,  
there is a 10% chance that he will choose me, giving me a value of 
$100 and a 90% chance that he will not choose me, giving a value 
of $0.  There is also a 90% chance that he will not come over.  
Thus my expected utility is 10% * [(10% * $100) + (90% * $0)] + 
90% * $0 = $1.
Strategy 2 – Buy a Drink: There is a 100% chance that he will come over, and when he  
does, there is a 10% chance that he will choose me, giving me a 
value of $100 and a 90% chance that he will not choose me, giving 
 
27 Under Rawls’ theory, even if the women each receive a benefit from watching the man choose their 
friend (which assumes a strong friendship,) they will still not buy the drink because the worst-case-scenario 
is if he chooses no one, in which case the women each remain with -$1.  Only if they get a benefit of at 




a value of $0.  Regardless, I will be loosing $1 by buying the drink.  
Thus my expected utility is 100% * [(10% * $100) + (90% * $0)] -
$1 = $9.
According to Harsanyi’s analysis, the women will choose to buy a drink for the 
man, since each individual’s expected utility is higher under strategy two ($9) than under 
strategy one ($1).28 Thus the women will form a community of sorts, each chipping in to 
buy the drink.  For a risk-averse individual, it is worthwhile to “bet” $1 in order to win 
$100.  And a group of people betting together in such a way forms them into a 
community, each acting morally according to Harsanyi’s theory. 
 This example of a moral community is particularly appropriate because this is the 
choice the women are likely to make even in the absence of a true veil of ignorance, 
indicating that at times, if there is enough uncertainty (in this case, uncertainty about who 
the man will choose,) people can consider themselves as being in an equiprobability 
model.  Hence even under normal real-life circumstances, people may act “morally” out 
of self-interest.  Of course, this is not always the case, but it does show that Harsanyi’s 
principles are not merely theoretical, but actually have some meaning towards situations 
where a community is structured around people making decisions based on their rational 
choices. 
 
28 Notice that this is also the utilitarian approach, as the group as a whole results in a 90% chance of his 
choosing one of the women, giving the group an expected utility of 90% * $100 - $9 = $81, whereas 
strategy one gives the group an expected utility of 10% * 90% * 100 = $9. 
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Appendix A – Rawls’ Decision
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Appendix B – Bayesian decision
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Appendix C – Evolutionary Dynamics 




















Appendix D – Evolutionary Dynamics 


























































Appendix E – A Drink from the Group
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